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Abstract: We explore the ethics of deliberately exposing consenting adults to SARS-CoV-
2 to induce immunity to the virus (“DEI” for short). We explain what a responsible DEI 
program might look like. We explore a consequentialist argument for DEI according to 
which DEI is a viable harm-reduction strategy. Then we consider a non-consequentialist 
argument for DEI that draws on the moral significance of consent. Additionally, we 
consider arguments for the view that DEI is unethical on the grounds that, given that large-
scale DEI would be highly likely to result in some severe illnesses and deaths, DEI 
amounts to a form of killing. Our thesis is that incorporating a DEI program alongside the 
status-quo “calibrate-the-curve” responses could have significant advantages at the early 
stages of pandemics. These potential advantages mean that, at a minimum, research into 
DEI would have been justified early in the COVID-19 pandemic, and that DEI programs 
should be explored as potential additions to our overall approach to emerging pandemics in 
the future. 
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1. Introduction 
As of this writing (December 2020), the COVID-19 pandemic has killed about 1.6 million 
people and, although vaccines have recently been approved for distribution, it continues to kill 
thousands each day. Nearly everyone in the world has spent months trying to avoid being 
exposed to SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. Few have considered seeking out 
exposure to the virus or deliberately exposing others to it. However, as early as February 2020, a 
small number of people—most notably the economist Robin Hanson—proposed deliberately 
exposing consenting adults to SARS-CoV-2 to induce immunity to the virus: “DEI” for short.1 
DEI would be dangerously irresponsible for those who will soon have access to immunity 
through safe vaccines, but the idea had several attractions early on in the pandemic. It’s 
important to explore these attractions not only in relation to the present moment in history but 
also for the future. Significant emerging or re-emerging infectious disease pandemics have been 
occurring about once every ten years and their frequency has been increasing.2 COVID-19 will 
not be humanity’s last major pandemic. By evaluating unconventional responses to the COVID-
19 pandemic such as DEI, we might lay useful groundwork for future contexts. 
Streiffer, Killoren, and Chappell The Ethics of Deliberate Exposure 
 
2 
One attraction of DEI is that it can increase population immunity.3 Population immunity is a 
social good, protecting the health of those not yet immune and allowing more social and 
economic freedom than would otherwise be possible. Importantly, if DEI were administered 
strategically, it is possible that it could dramatically reduce infection rates even with low 
participation numbers as we explain below (Section 3.1). 
Other attractions of DEI are more individualistic: DEI-induced immunity might enable an 
individual to acquire an “immunity certificate” which would exempt them from restrictions on 
travel, work, etc.; it could also enable them to interact with friends or loved ones without fear of 
transmitting or contracting the virus. Additionally, DEI might (somewhat paradoxically) reduce 
individuals’ risk of serious COVID-19 disease, for reasons we explain below (Section 3). We’ll 
also explore arguments from a non-consequentialist perspective for the view that consensually 
exposing individuals who seek immunity has a moral advantage when the alternative is 
accidental and hence non-consensual exposure (Section 4). 
Although DEI might sound like science fiction, it has historical precedent. Before the 
development of a smallpox vaccine, a method known as “variolation”—exposing a healthy 
individual to phlegm, scabs, or other material from someone infected with smallpox—was used 
to provoke mild infections to cause immunity. And even today, a crude form of DEI has already 
occurred in the form of “COVID parties,” where groups of people intermingle in hope of 
catching the virus. In at least one case, someone died of the virus after attending such a party.4 
Such parties are morally objectionable in many ways: steps are not taken to minimize risks of 
infection and attendees typically take no precautions to prevent the virus from spreading beyond 
partygoers. But in this paper we will outline a more sophisticated type of DEI program that 
includes such precautions, and others as well. It turns out to be surprisingly difficult to show that 
DEI carried out responsibly is unjustifiable. 
Our thesis is that incorporating a DEI program into public policy could have had significant 
advantages over the status quo that prevailed in most places during the pandemic. These 
potential advantages mean that, at a minimum, research into DEI would have been justified early 
in the COVID-19 pandemic, and that DEI programs should be explored as potential additions to 
our overall approach to emerging pandemics in the future. 
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Many would reject DEI out of hand, claiming that deliberately exposing people to a deadly 
virus is obviously unethical. But a different form of deliberate exposure, namely that involved in 
human challenge trials of SARS-CoV-2 vaccines, has been seen as defensible by many. 
A human challenge trial is a somewhat unconventional method for testing vaccine 
effectiveness. In normal phase 3 trials for vaccines, subjects are given either an experimental 
vaccine or a placebo. Researchers then wait for subjects to be “naturally” exposed to the virus in 
the course of their normal lives and compare the rates of infection in the two groups to determine 
whether the vaccine is effective. This results in a lengthy waiting period.5 In human challenge 
trials, the lengthy waiting period required for natural exposure is replaced with the administration 
of a controlled, deliberate exposure to the virus.6 
Human challenge trials are controversial but, as mentioned, many see them as morally 
defensible. Over 38,000 people from over 100 countries have expressed willingness to volunteer 
for such studies; prominent ethicists, such as Nir Eyal, argued forcefully in favor of such studies 
in the early days of the pandemic; and after many months of debate, the UK’s COVID-19 
Vaccine Taskforce has agreed to fund a $13-million-dollar human challenge trial scheduled to 
begin in January 2021.7 
It has been argued that if human challenge trials had been conducted soon after the first 
emergence of SARS-CoV-2, this could have made a vaccine available many months ahead of 
schedule, which could have prevented thousands of deaths and benefited billions of people by 
shortening the duration of the present crisis. And although some of the most heavily criticized 
human subjects research in history involved intentionally exposing people to disease agents, 
human challenge studies (when responsibly conducted and consensual) have been accepted as an 
ethical way to investigate a variety of pathogens, including influenza, malaria, shigella, 
tuberculosis, cholera, typhoid, dengue fever, and others.8 
DEI and human challenge studies are similar in that both involve deliberately exposing 
people to a deadly virus. So, if ethically acceptable human challenge studies with SARS-CoV-2 
are possible, this shows that DEI cannot be rejected merely because it involves deliberate 
exposure to a deadly disease. Of course, there are important differences between DEI and human 
challenge trials, as will become obvious (if it isn’t already) as our discussion proceeds. 
Our first task is to explain a possible DEI program and to compare public policy that 
includes a DEI program to the status quo that has prevailed in most places during the pandemic 
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(Section 2). Then we will lay out tentative consequentialist and non-consequentialist arguments 
for a public policy involving DEI (Sections 3 and 4). We then turn to an objection to DEI based 
on the doing/allowing distinction (Section 5). 
2 Deliberate Exposure for the Purpose of Inducing Immunity (DEI) 
To have a specific proposal to discuss, we’ll outline a possible DEI program (2.1). Then we’ll 
explain the idea of “calibrating the curve” and argue that the policies of many countries can be 
characterized in terms of calibrating the curve (2.2). This will set the stage for us to argue in 
favor of supplementing policies that calibrate the curve with a DEI program. 
2.1 A possible DEI program 
The DEI program we’ll outline involves up to four stages: a design stage; a recruitment stage; a 
dose-finding stage; and an implementation stage. 
The main task for the design stage is to develop a standardized delivery method for exposing 
volunteers to SARS-CoV-2. Because there is reason to believe that lower viral doses cause less 
severe disease, the delivery method should be able to reliably deliver low doses of SARS-CoV-
2.9 Also, the dosage level needs to be adjustable as needed in the dose-finding stage. 
In the recruitment stage, a small group of research volunteers for the dose-finding stage are 
recruited and carefully screened. To reduce risks, those above a certain age and those with 
various comorbidities are excluded.10 Preference should be given to volunteers already at higher-
than-average risk of natural exposure to the virus (e.g., emergency room doctors and grocery 
store employees).11 As with other research which exposes people to significant risk, rigorous 
informed consent procedures are used to help subjects understand the nature of the program, its 
risks and benefits, alternatives, and other relevant information. 
In the dose-finding stage, recruited volunteers are used to determine the safest dose of 
SARS-VoC-2 sufficient to provoke a robust immune response—call this the optimal dose.12 
After exposure, volunteers are housed in what Hanson playfully dubs “hero hotels” where they 
are isolated to prevent transmission to others and provided medical care.13 After the volunteers 
recover, they are given the option of participating in immunity experiments in which they are re-
exposed to the virus and monitored to determine if the dose was sufficient to produce immunity. 
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What happens next depends crucially on the results from the dose-finding stage. In an 
optimistic scenario, the dose-finding stage reveals that (i) optimal-dose exposures result in much 
less severe disease than natural exposure and (ii) exposure induces robust, long-lasting 
immunity. In this scenario, DEI may be attractive to a large number of volunteers and it may be 
reasonable to proceed to an implementation stage in which procedures developed and refined 
during the dose-finding stage are applied in a public health initiative to a large number of 
consenting volunteers. Again, those above a certain age and those with various comorbidities are 
excluded and preference is given to those with a higher-than-average risk of natural exposure. As 
with other medical procedures that expose individuals to significant risk, rigorous informed 
consent procedures are used to help ensure volunteers understand relevant information. Again, 
volunteers exposed to the virus will be quarantined and provided with medical care. (Optionally, 
DEI could be preceded by experimental vaccination to help further reduce risks.14) 
In the most pessimistic scenario, the dose-finding stage reveals that (i*) disease severity 
resulting from optimal-dose exposures is not appreciably different from (or is even worse than) 
disease severity resulting from natural exposure and (ii*) exposure does not confer any lasting 
immunity. In the pessimistic scenario, the program would be discontinued before reaching the 
implementation stage. 
A number of middle scenarios may be more likely than either of those two scenarios. The 
scale and design of the implementation stage should be adjustable in light of observations from 
the dose-finding stage. 
We acknowledge that this is only a bare outline of a DEI program, but it will suffice for our 
purposes. 
2.2 Calibrating the curve 
Would public policy involving DEI have been the best response to the threat posed by SARS-
CoV-2? To answer that definitively would require surveying all possible approaches, a task 
beyond the scope of this paper. We will focus on the more tractable question of whether 
incorporating DEI into our pandemic response might have represented an improvement on the 
status quo. Before addressing that question, it’s necessary to sketch the main type of pandemic-
related public policy that was implemented in many countries. Then, we’ll consider whether that 
type of policy could be improved by incorporating DEI. We remind our readers that we are 
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addressing what should have been done during the early stages of a pandemic, long before the 
availability of immunity through safe vaccines. 
Many public policies have been advertised as having the aim of flattening the curve. 
However, there’s an often-overlooked distinction between two different types of curve-flattening 
policies. Policies that aim to smash the curve (STC) aim to reduce infection rates as low as can 
be achieved, ideally to zero. An STC policy is successful on its own terms only when the 
infection rate cannot be reduced any lower. In contrast, policies that aim to calibrate the curve 
(CTC) aim to reduce the infection rate below what it would be with no interventions at all but 
nonetheless aim at a targeted range of infection rates that is higher than the lowest that can be 
achieved. A CTC policy is successful on its own terms as long as the infection rate in the 
population covered by the policy is within the targeted range. 
At the outset of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, some governments announced STC policies. 
Officials in the United States appeared to believe that the virus could be eradicated.15 However, 
although eradication seems to have been achieved in some countries (e.g., New Zealand and 
Australia), it seems that it cannot be achieved without a vaccine in most countries because it 
would require extreme measures that are probably politically impossible. 
The prevalence of STC rhetoric notwithstanding, CTC policies have proven far more 
common than STC policies. Any government policy that imposes behavioral restrictions (e.g., 
physical distancing, handwashing and face-mask requirements, school closings, bans on large 
gatherings) until an infection rate is reached that is perceived as sufficiently low (even though it 
could be made lower), and that then relaxes the restrictions until a higher infection rate threshold 
is reached, counts as a CTC policy.16 
Different CTC policies involve different triggers—threshold conditions in which behavioral 
restrictions are imposed or lifted—which will result in different numbers and distributions of 
infections and deaths. We can also distinguish different CTC policies in terms of the further aims 
that accompany them. All CTC policies by definition aim to calibrate the infection rate, i.e., to 
keep the infection rate within a specified target range, but this calibration is never an end in 
itself; rather, it is instrumental to some further aim. 
Sometimes, a CTC policy’s further aim is to achieve population immunity as quickly as 
possible without overwhelming the medical system with cases of severe disease. For example, a 
high level of population immunity was originally the explicit aim of CTC policies pursued in the 
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UK and the Netherlands, although they later backed away from such language because achieving 
high levels of population immunity through uncontrolled spread was predicted by many to have 
disastrous consequences.17 
In other cases, a CTC policy does not aim at increasing population immunity, but instead 
aims to strike the right balance between reducing citizens’ risk of exposure to the virus and other 
values, say, the value of preserving and enhancing citizens’ personal and economic freedoms. 
A CTC policy may still be in effect even if it has not been explicitly endorsed. In the 
absence of a robust alternative policy, if a government is disposed to impose behavioral 
restrictions when infections are above an upper threshold and to relax those restrictions when 
infections fall below a lower threshold, then that government has a de facto CTC policy. This 
plausibly describes the dispositions that many governments had in response to the pandemic. 
All CTC policies have a common morally significant feature: they all allow preventable 
infections to occur in order to pursue some other aim. When behavioral restrictions are lifted in 
accordance with a CTC policy, this foreseeably results in an increase in infections that could 
have been prevented had the restrictions not been lifted. 
We next consider arguments for the view that incorporating into public policy a responsible 
DEI program along the lines outlined above would have been an improvement on status quo 
CTC policies. We consider consequentialist arguments based on DEI’s potential for harm-
reduction in Section 3 and non-consequentialist arguments grounded in the moral significance of 
consent in Section 4. 
3 Consequentialist arguments for DEI18 
There are at least two sets of reasons to think that a DEI program of the sort sketched in Section 
2.1 might have been able to reduce overall harm, had it been implemented at an early stage of the 
pandemic. We focus on the United States, but our points likely generalize to other countries that 
experienced similar infection rates and dynamics. 
3.1 DEI allows infections to be shifted from the vulnerable to the more resilient 
Assume for the moment that, during the course of the pandemic, a high level of population 
immunity (sufficient for herd immunity) will be achieved through SARS-CoV-2 infection before 
the virus is brought under control by a vaccine or effective treatment. (Recall early estimates that 
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a vaccine would take 18 months or more to develop.) Once this high level of population 
immunity is achieved, suppose the virus will cease spreading and thus a significant fraction of 
the population will be protected from the virus. Research on COVID-10 suggests that around 
43% to 50% of the U.S. population would need to be infected to reach this point.19 We will use 
50% as an example. 
To achieve this level of population immunity in the U.S., then, 50% of the U.S. population, 
or about 160 million people, would eventually be infected. However, crucially, who gets infected 
remains an open question. This level of population immunity could be achieved by infecting a 
mix of people that predominantly includes older, more vulnerable Americans; but it could 
equally be achieved by infecting a younger, less vulnerable mix of Americans. It’s unknowable 
in advance what the rate of severe disease would be in these scenarios, but clearly hospitalization 
rates and death rates would be dramatically higher in the first, given that age is the most 
important risk factor for severe COVID-19 disease.20 It is possible that hundreds of thousands 
more deaths would occur in the first scenario than in the second. 
A DEI program would not enable us to precisely determine the mix of exposed individuals, 
given that uncontrolled spread would continue alongside any DEI program that might be 
implemented, and given that participation in any such program would be voluntary. However, a 
DEI program would be a way for a society to guide its future in a direction that is more like the 
second scenario than the first scenario. That’s because a DEI program enables policymakers to 
shift the spread toward those who are more capable of surviving infection: individuals who are 
relatively young (though old enough to give consent), free of known comorbidities, and 
otherwise well-positioned to survive infection without serious complications.21 
Consider a very ambitious scenario. Suppose a DEI program had been implemented early in 
the pandemic which recruited half of the top 25% most resilient citizens of the United States; this 
would mean a program involving 41 million volunteers.22 The result would be that 41 million 
individuals who are less resilient, and more vulnerable to serious disease and death, might be 
spared infection before a high level of population immunity is achieved. We cannot know how 
many lives might have been spared by such a shift, but it seems plausible that this would have 
spared many more lives than it would have cost. 
Further, and perhaps more importantly, even a significantly less ambitious approach could 
save lives. This can be seen by considering “ring vaccination,” where the close contacts of newly 
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discovered cases are vaccinated. This approach has been used to control the spread of many 
contagious diseases, including smallpox. A similar approach could be used with DEI. A DEI 
program that is targeted toward individuals who work or live in close proximity to recent or 
anticipated outbreaks could create a “ring” of immunity that prevents or reduces spread, and 
might be able to do so with relatively few participants. 
A salient example for many academics and students involves college campuses. As 
universities in the northern hemisphere planned for the start of a Fall 2020 semester, there was 
widespread belief that students would travel and socialize in ways that would result in major 
outbreaks. Most such students were at low risk of severe health impacts from COVID-19, but 
others in the community were more vulnerable. A DEI program targeted at low-risk college 
students with the goal of providing immunity before the semester began might have served to 
protect the broader community, potentially saving many lives.23 
Even in the few countries that have had success in smashing the curve (e.g., Australia), 
using DEI to immunize the ring of individuals who help administer quarantine procedures for 
incoming travellers could help protect against future outbreaks. Such an approach might have 
prevented the May/June outbreak in Melbourne believed to have originated in a quarantine hotel, 
sparing Melbourne hundreds of deaths and a painful four-month lockdown.24 
It is important to emphasize here that the scenarios we have just sketched are or were 
possible only if recovery from infection results in significant immunity. If infection does not 
result in any significant immunity, not even partial or temporary immunity, then population 
immunity is not possible without an effective vaccine; and a DEI program would not be justified. 
In the absence of certain knowledge that recovery results in immunity, the case for a DEI 
program rests largely on the probability that recovery results in significant immunity. 
Determining this probability is a task for epidemiologists and other experts—though early 
evidence suggested that infection with SARS-CoV-2 in mild to moderate cases produces 
antibody responses that are “robust, neutralizing and are stable for at least 3 months” and more 
recent research continues to support the idea that infection results in significant immunity.25 
3.2 DEI allows control over the circumstances of infection 
DEI also has a number of advantages over unintentional exposure deriving from the level of 
control that it affords in managing the initial infection and subsequent disease. 
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We’ve already mentioned one advantage: DEI allows minimization of the viral dose 
involved in exposure, which may reduce the severity of the resulting infection.26 We cannot 
know the magnitude of this effect specifically for SARS-CoV-2 without further research, but the 
potential significance is immense: In the case of smallpox, inoculation via deliberate low-dose 
‘variolation’ reduced the case fatality rate from 20-30% to 0.5-2%.27 If DEI turned out to be 
anywhere near that effective for SARS-CoV-2, it could have saved hundreds of thousands of 
lives while the world waited for safe vaccines. 
Hanson draws on a wider array of historical data (including, most relevantly, studies 
showing how natural variation in initial viral dose significantly affected fatality rates from 
SARS-CoV-1) to support his estimate that inoculation could cut COVID-19 deaths by a factor of 
three or more.28 Again, this is a highly uncertain estimate, and direct research on SARS-CoV-2 
inoculation would be needed to ground a more robust verdict. Given the immense (but uncertain) 
potential to save lives, there was a strong case to undertake such research, back when vaccine 
development was at a much less mature stage.29 If inoculation lived up to its potential, the ability 
to discover and reliably deliver an optimal viral dose would be a major factor in the 
consequentialist case for implementing a DEI program at an early stage of the pandemic. 
On the assumption that infection confers substantial immunity and thus any given individual 
is unlikely to be infected twice, it may have been reasonable for individuals to seek intentional 
low-dose exposures via a DEI program to immunize themselves against the risk of an accidental 
high-dose exposure. This prudential case is enhanced because, as discussed above, DEI programs 
would be targeted to people with a higher risk of natural exposure. Thus, the advisability of 
enrolling in a DEI program would depend on, for example, whether one lives in New York City, 
where it’s been estimated 40%-80% of the population will be exposed before the pandemic is 
over, or in New Zealand, which has virtually eradicated the virus.30 
Additionally, giving individuals control over the time at which they are infected can reduce 
harm for the simple reason that illness can be more intrusive at different times. It is worse to 
become ill when one is nine months pregnant, undergoing chemotherapy, or starting a new 
business. Because participation in a DEI program would be voluntary, individuals involved can 
be expected to submit to being exposed at a time that is, comparatively speaking, not extremely 
inconvenient for them. This could then be expected to reduce the number of accidental infections 
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experienced by those for whom the timing of the illness would be particularly damaging because 
of their life circumstances.31 
Moreover, in a DEI program, everyone exposed would know that they have been exposed 
whereas accidental exposures are typically unnoticed until symptomatic. This can be likely to aid 
in harm reduction for two reasons. 
First, since DEI provides knowledge of infection prior to the onset of symptoms, it enables 
forms of early treatment that would otherwise typically not be possible, including earlier anti-
viral treatment that could prove helpful at preventing severe illness.32 Second, knowledge of 
infection is useful for reducing the risk that one’s infection poses to others. Such knowledge 
prevents accidental spread from asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic individuals who fail to self-
isolate because they do not realize that they’ve been infected. Together, these factors suggest 
that, if DEI confers immunity on someone that prevents them from subsequently acquiring an 
uncontrolled infection, this substitution is likely to be beneficial for both the individual and 
others. 
A final benefit of DEI has to do with infection overshoot. If a high level of population 
immunity is achieved through uncontrolled viral spread, high levels of uncontrolled spread 
would continue for a time even after the threshold for herd immunity has been passed.33 DEI 
would have a significantly reduced chance of such overshoot because participants would be 
isolated while they are contagious, whereas people with non-deliberate infections are typically 
contagious for days before they are aware they have been infected.34 
3.3 Extending the argument 
What if we relax the assumption of the previous two sections that herd immunity would be 
reached through natural infection prior to the arrival of a safe and effective vaccine? In that case, 
we cannot assume that each instance of DEI substitutes for one uncontrolled infection. Instead, 
we need to separately consider two kinds of possibilities: (i) those where a DEI participant would 
have otherwise contracted an uncontrolled infection, and (ii) those where the participant would 
have otherwise avoided infection entirely. 
Clearly, the overall health benefits of a DEI program stem from cases of the first kind, 
whereas the downside risks stem from cases of the second kind. So, whether the overall health 
benefits outweigh the costs depends upon the balance between these two kinds of cases. As 
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we’ve seen, type-(i) cases are likely beneficial, on average, both to the participant themselves 
and to the broader community. Each type-(i) case of DEI helps to reduce community spread and 
reduce the total number of SARS-CoV-2 infections that occur in the population prior to the 
arrival of a vaccine.35 Each type-(ii) case of DEI increases the total number of infections, beyond 
what would otherwise have occurred, by one. 
If DEI is well-targeted at higher-exposure groups and potential “super-spreaders”, then it 
could conceivably reduce the total number of infections. But it may be more likely that the 
number of type-(ii) cases would be greater than the reduction in community spread due to type-
(i) cases, resulting in a net increase in total infections. In that case, whether DEI reduces the 
direct health toll of the pandemic would depend upon how much safer each instance of DEI 
proved in comparison to uncontrolled infections. 
Finally, even if DEI increases the direct health toll from SARS-CoV-2, it could still be 
beneficial overall if it reduced the indirect (e.g., social, economic, and mental health) costs that 
result from lockdowns under a pure CTC policy. How the direct costs of DEI would compare to 
the indirect costs of CTC is an incredibly complex empirical question that we cannot address 
here. But this is a crucial question for experts to closely examine early in a pandemic. Just as it 
would be reckless to blindly assume that CTC with DEI would prove superior, so too should we 
not blindly assume that CTC (without DEI) is superior. Given the immense stakes, it’s vital that, 
early in a pandemic, serious effort is put into discovering the best available policy responses. 
4 Non-Consequentialist Arguments for DEI 
In the previous section, we considered reasons to think that a policy that incorporates DEI could 
reduce overall harm caused by SARS-CoV-2. However, there are further reasons for DEI that do 
not depend on considerations about overall harm. as we now explain. 
4.1 DEI and the Morally Transformative Power of Consent 
Consider two hypothetical scenarios:  
DEI scenario 
A responsible DEI program is incorporated into a CTC policy at an early stage of the 
pandemic. 25% of the U.S. population participates and is infected deliberately and with their 
consent. An additional 25% of the population is infected accidentally through natural 
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exposure and without their consent. Some number of individuals in each group die. Then a 
level of population immunity is achieved sufficient to prevent viral spread. 
 
CTC scenario 
No DEI program is implemented at any stage of the pandemic. Rather, a CTC policy is 
followed in which infections are allowed to occur through natural exposure. Accidental 
infections continue to occur at a low but non-zero rate until 50% of the U.S. population is 
eventually infected. Some number of these individuals die. Then a level of population 
immunity is achieved sufficient to prevent viral spread. 
From many standard non-consequentialist perspectives, the CTC scenario, where the number of 
non-consensual exposures is higher, is morally worse than the DEI scenario even if total harm in 
each scenario is the same. Swapping non-consensual exposures for consensual exposures is 
morally sound policy according to standard non-consequentialist views because, other things 
equal, non-consensual exposures are morally worse than consensual exposures. 
Non-consequentialists typically believe that consent can be morally transformative.36 Within 
limits, consent can reduce how morally problematic a harm is and can make permissible an 
action that would have been wrong: compare kidnapping to giving someone a ride, and battery to 
a medical exam. Just as harm resulting from voluntary participation in a sport is less morally 
problematic than the same level of harm resulting from assault, harm resulting from consensual 
exposure to SARS-CoV-2 is less morally problematic than the same level of harm resulting from 
non-consensual exposure. 
According to this argument, a government ought not allow 50% of its citizens to be infected 
against their will if it could replace half of those infections with consensual infections through a 
DEI program. 
4.2 DEI and governments’ special obligations 
One common view is that governments have morally significant relationships to their citizens, 
grounding special responsibilities to protect those citizens. For example, it’s plausible that the 
government of Ecuador is morally obliged to protect the people of Ecuador but has no similar 
obligation to protect the people of France. One might think that these special relationships are 
incompatible with facilitating or even allowing a DEI program that foreseeably results in severe 
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illness for some citizens. 
However, if such special governmental responsibilities to protect their citizens exist, these 
responsibilities have a different shape if a citizen voluntarily chooses to risk their own lives or 
interests. In the case of DEI, people would be voluntarily undertaking risks with knowledge of 
what they are agreeing to. Those who tragically die in the course of voluntary participation in a 
DEI program may be seen as similar to firefighters and others who engage in noble but 
dangerous acts in pursuit of worthy goals. Although all reasonable steps should be taken to 
mitigate the necessity and magnitude of such sacrifices, the government may justifiably adopt 
policies and public health programs that allow and even encourage such actions. Thus, although 
the government arguably has a special obligation to its citizens to protect them from being 
infected against their will (i.e., without their consent), it has at most only a weaker (and thus 
more easily overridden) obligation to prevent its citizens from taking well-informed risks to their 
lives in reasonable pursuit of other valuable aims. If so, then the government can reduce the 
extent to which it violates its special obligations to its citizens if it adopts or allows a DEI 
program that reduces non-consensual infections by increasing consensual infections. 
These non-consequentialist, consent-based arguments can be significantly strengthened 
when combined with some of the consequentialist harm-reduction considerations adduced in 
Section 3. If an individual will likely have a non-consensual, extremely harmful high-dose 
exposure in an uncontrolled setting, and can instead consensually choose to have what will likely 
be a significantly less harmful low-dose exposure in a controlled setting, it seems eminently 
justifiable to allow them that choice, even if, tragically, they end up suffering a worse outcome. 
5 DEI and the Doing/Allowing Distinction 
According to what we’ll call the doing/allowing objection to DEI, the CTC scenario is morally 
preferable to the DEI scenario because the DEI scenario involves causing people to become 
infected whereas the CTC scenario merely involves allowing people to be infected. The 
objection continues: When volunteers in a DEI program are deliberately infected and some die as 
a result, those who die are thereby killed. By contrast, when a CTC policy is implemented, this 
only results in accidental infections and deaths; it does not involve killing. Other things being 
equal, killing is always far worse than letting die; therefore, the DEI scenario is far worse than 
the CTC scenario. 
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In response, the DEI defender can observe that in some cases, letting die seems morally 
similar to killing. Consider James Rachels’ widely discussed Smith and Jones cases.37 To secure 
a large inheritance, Smith drowns his six-year-old cousin. To secure a large inheritance, Jones 
watches and does nothing as his six-year-old cousin accidentally drowns. Many people believe 
that Jones’s allowing of his cousin to die is as seriously wrong, or almost as seriously wrong, as 
Smith’s killing of his cousin. If this is correct, then, the doing/allowing objection’s claim that, 
other things equal, killing is always far worse than letting die, is false. 
Of course, even if CTC policies involve something as bad as killing and so don’t differ from 
a DEI program on that score, that leaves open whether, other things equal, both are permissible 
or both are impermissible. Assuming, as we and many think, the aims of population immunity or 
increased social and economic freedom can justify a CTC policy which allows some people to 
die avoidable deaths, it is arguable that these aims can also justify a DEI program even if it 
causes some people’s deaths.38 
More provocatively, one can take issue with the claim made by the doing/allowing objection 
that CTC policies merely involve letting citizens die. Some philosophers have argued that 
allowing someone to die can be a way of killing them. And in the current pandemic context, 
some commentators have claimed that existing CTC policies involve killing people and that 
proposals to reach high levels of population immunity through uncontrolled spread involve 
killing and even “mass murder.”39 
If allowings can be killings, it’s possible to argue that when—in accordance with a CTC 
policy—a government calibrates behavioral restrictions so as to allow some citizens to be 
infected, knowing that some of the infected will die, it thereby kills the citizens who die as a 
result. That is, it is possible to endorse the following principle: 
Virus Killing Principle: If (i) a citizen is infected with SARS-CoV-2 and subsequently dies, 
and (ii) that citizen’s government could have prevented them from being infected in the first 
place but instead relaxed behavioral restrictions which resulted in their being infected, then 
the government has killed that citizen. 
The Virus Killing Principle will be controversial, as it involves an expansive notion of killing. 
We won’t try to defend (or attack) this principle here (except to note that some people seem to be 
reasoning from some version of this principle when they claim, as mentioned above, that 
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government policies that allow uncontrolled spread amount to killing). But we will argue that 
this principle could ground a response to the doing/allowing objection. 
The response proceeds from the rather anodyne claim that not all killings are morally equal. 
Specifically, when an action kills an individual, if that individual has consented to that action 
before she is killed, then the action is less morally bad than it would have been had the victim not 
consented. Imagine that you are mountain climbing. Something has gone horribly wrong. You 
are attached to your partner by a rope as they dangle above a deep chasm. If you cut the rope, 
you thereby kill them (or so it is intuitive to claim). But that act of killing is less morally bad if 
your partner insists that you cut the rope to improve your chances than if your partner has begged 
you to not cut the rope. This example supports the following general principle: 
Consent Principle: All else equal, consensual killings are morally better than non-consensual 
killings. 
If one were to accept both the Virus Killing Principle and the Consent Principle, then one should 
maintain that the DEI scenario above is morally preferable to the CTC scenario above, even if 
the total number of deaths from SARS-CoV-2 in each scenario is the same. For in the DEI 
scenario, there are (given the Virus Killing Principle) fewer non-consensual killings and more 
consensual killings relative to the CTC scenario, and this (according to the Consent Principle) is 
morally preferable to more non-consensual killings and fewer consensual killings (provided the 
total number of killings is equal in each case). Thus, we have a non-consequentialist argument 
from the Virus Killing Principle and the Consent Principle for the view that adoption of a DEI 
program can represent a moral improvement over the status quo even if it does not reduce overall 
harm. 
The foregoing responses to the doing/allowing objection will be controversial and cannot be 
fully developed in this paper. We’ve laid it out here only to illustrate that those who make the 
doing/allowing objection cannot assume that the distinction between killing and letting die 
straightforwardly supports CTC over DEI. 
Lastly, even if DEI programs kill and CTC policies alone merely let people die, and even if 
killing is worse than letting die, other things being equal, it needs to be reiterated that all of that 
is still compatible with DEI programs being justified when other things are not equal, as they 
may well not be. In particular, deaths that occur as a result of a DEI program will be the result of 
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a consensual exposure, rather than a non-consensual exposure, and, depending on the empirical 
facts discussed earlier, the risk of death and other harms may be substantially reduced by a DEI 
program. The fact is that justified government policies and programs, including justified public 
health policies and programs, frequently reduce overall harm as well as personal risk without 
being free of all risk of causing deaths; recall the example of human challenge studies for SARS-
CoV-2 vaccines. 
6. Conclusion 
Our purpose in this paper has not been to offer a decisive argument that a responsible DEI 
program should have been incorporated at the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, or that 
such programs should be used in the early stages of future pandemics. Indeed, despite everything 
we have said in this paper, as a group of authors we remain collectively uncertain about whether 
a DEI would have been morally defensible in light of the numerous empirical and ethical 
uncertainties discussed above and will be sensitive to facts which may well be different in future 
pandemics. Moreover, there are arguments against DEI not addressed in this paper. For example, 
a DEI program could feed public distrust in health authorities, which might contribute to other 
problems, such as an increase in vaccine hesitancy. Since we have not given a full accounting of 
all of the counts for and against DEI, we cannot claim to have settled anything. Nevertheless, we 
believe that the series of arguments that we’ve laid out in this paper deserve ethicists’ attention. 
Even if it was always unlikely that a DEI program would be implemented in response to the 
current pandemic, DEI nonetheless serves as a hypothetical case study for examining much more 
general issues concerning the moral significance of consent. There are many deep and 
unresolved philosophical questions about the circumstances in which we should allow 
consenting adults to engage in activities that are or might be harmful to them, and consideration 
of DEI may help to further our understanding of these questions. Consideration of DEI in the 
context of SARS-CoV-2 may also be useful to ethicists and policymakers in the future, who may 
need to think about unconventional approaches like DEI to deal with new infectious pathogens 
that will almost certainly emerge in the coming years. 
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